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RECENT CASE NOTES
is still subject to liability to them despite his discharge by his employer. 8
The term "imminently dangerous" developed in both types of cases from
a few exceptions to a multitude, and thus became an important qualification
to both rules, and in the case of manufacturers actually destroyed the rule.
The cases in Indiana show a development in conformity. In Daugherty
v. Herzog, plaintiff was injured when a building fell two years after re-
modelling due to the negligence of the defendant in fastening the beams
and ironwork; however, the court held this building was not imminently
dangerous to third persons.9 More recently in Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart
the doctrine was greatly extended; it was held here that negligently shutting
off steam in one apartment so that the pipes froze and leaked water through
the floor damaging the goods of the tenant below was an act "imminently
dangerous" to third persons.1O Evidently this case and the present one
have so greatly extended the meaning of "imminently dangerous" as almost
to destroy the rule. While there are some dicta in both cases for basing
liability alone on negligence toward the injured party irrespective of con-
tractual relation, the courts as a whole have so far failed to extend the rule
to that point.
Judging from the present rule concerning privity of contract as relating
to negligence of manufacturers and the close similarity in the development
of the rule as relating to independent contractors, we may expect that in the
near future the courts will drop the distinction between things "imminently
dangerous" and things not "imminently dangerous." Constructing or installing
structures or equipment in such a manner as to constitute an unreasonable
danger to property interests or the safety of third persons will alone be
enough to subject the contractor to liability. The discharge rule would then
operate only as a discharge toward the employer himself and would not
discharge the duty of an independent contractor toward third persons.
W. E. B.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-RIGHT TO RECOVER COMPENSATION.-An
employee of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was killed under circum-
stances that gave rise to a claim against the railroad company. Plaintiff, a
retired railroad claim agent, undertook to negotiate a settlement with the rail-
road company upon the behalf of the widow and minor children pursuant to
an understanding that he was to be paid a reasonable sum for services ren-
dered. Through his negotiations a settlement was finally effected. On distribu-
tion of the amount received the widow as administratrix refused to pay the
plaintiff. In the lower court the plaintiff recovered for services rendered. On
appeal, reversed: the court holding that the settling of a claim constituted the
practice of law and that any unlicensed person engaged in the practice of
law cannot recover for services rendered. Fink u. Peden (Ind. 1938), 17 N.
E. (2d) 95.
8 Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680;
Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co. (1928), 331o Ill. 78, 164 N. E. 162.
9 Daugherty v. Herzog (1896), 145 Ind. 255, 44 N. E. 457; Travix v. Roches-
ter Bridge Co. (1919), 188 Ind. 79, 122 N. E. 1.
1OPeru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680;
Casey v. Hoover et al. (1905), 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S. W. 330.
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The practice of the law is an exclusive privilege which is limited to those
who have qualified and complied with the necessary requirements as set forth
by the constitution, the statutes, and the rules of the court. 1 It is not a right
guaranteed by the constitution, 2 but it is in the nature of a franchise from the
state conferred only for merit to a limited few who have fulfilled certain
requirements.3
An all-embracing definition of the term practice of law would involve great
difficulty. Of course, it is well-established that the practice of law is not
confined to practice in the court, and that the vast bulk of legal work is done
outside the courts. 4 But what its outermost limits and ramifications are, no
one knows.5 The tendency is to broaden its meaning to include all work
involving legal knowledge and advice whether inside or outside the court and
to determine each case largely on its own particular facts.6
On the facts of the present case the court had great difficulty in determining
the definition of the practice of law. And while deciding that an agreement
by a claim adjuster to investigate the case does not in itself amount to such
practice, a contract whereby he undertakes to "enforce, secure, settle, adjust,
and compromise" whatever claim the plaintiff had does constitute the practice
of law, since it necessitates the use of legal knowledge and counsel.7 And this
would be true even though the layman agreed to do so gratuitously,8 and
though he did not hold himself out as an attorny.9
The chief reason for the added interest in this field is the advent of the
unauthorized layman into the practice of law. His entrance has been mfirked
by a steady and gradual encroachment until today it assumes almost overwhelm-
ing proportions, being carried on through the following lay agencies: banks
and trust companies, collective agencies, trade associations and clubs, credit
associations, title companies, mortgage loan companies, real-estate brokers, and
many others.' 0
The reasons for the entrance of the layman and the lay agencies into the
field of the practice of law are principally economic ones, some of them
12 R. C. L. 940; People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real-Estate
Taxpayers of Ill. (1933), 354 11. 102, 187 N. E. 823.
2 State v. Rosborough (1922), 152 La. 945, 94 So. 858; In re Maddox (1901),
93 Md. 727, 50 A. 487.
3 State v. Rosborough (1922), 152 La. 945, 94 So. 858.
4 Eley v. Miller (1893), 7 Ind. App. 529, 535, 34 N. E. 836, 111 A. L. R. 21.
5 Depew et al. v. Wichita Assn. of Credit Men, Inc. et al. (1935), 142 Kan.
403, 49 P. (2d) 1041, 1046.
6 Re Shoe Mfgrs. Protective Assn. (Mass., 1936), 3 N. E. (2d) 746, 748;
Jessup, in his work on Legal Ethics defines the practice of law as: "The practice
of the law is any service, involving legal knowledge, whether of representation,
counsel, or advocacy, in or out of court, rendered in respect of the rights,
duties, obligations, liabilities, or business relations of the one requesting the
services."
7 Meunier v. Bernick (La. App., 1936), 170 So. 567.
8 Creditors Natl. Clearing House v. Bannwort (1917), 227 Mass. 579, 116
N. E. 886.
9State ex rel. Wright, Atty. Gen. v. Barlow (1936), 131 Neb. 700) 268
N. W. 95.
10 American Bar Assn., "Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law," 56 Rep. Amer. Bar. Assn. 470, 471474 (1931) ; see also
111 A. L. R. 19; Hicks and Katz, "The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay
Agencies," 41 Yale L. J. 69.
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being: more technical skill along certain lines, more efficiency, speed, less
expense and high financial responsibility.1
The arguments for the continuance of such practices are varied. Some
say the purpose of the statutes requiring all persons to be licensed12 is to
preserve the public welfare by excluding from practice persons with inadequate
ability, morality, and learning;'3 that as long as the attorneys of a corpora-
tion are properly licensed and their professional activities are not interferred
with by unlicensed persons, the purpose of the statute is fully effected;14
and that the courts have misconstrued the purpose of such statutes in holding
that corporations cannot practice law because of their inability to meet the
educational and character requirements.15 Other arguments are that although
such practices do impair the relations between client and .attorney, they
usually exist in the field where intimate personal relation is comparatively
unnecessary. Another argument is that such corporations are amenable to
government regulations, so they should be regulated instead of destroyed.17
In rebuttal, the claim of the Bar to continue its monopoly in this field to the
exclusion of all others rests upon two principal grounds; first, established
expertness in the legal field, and secondly, a higher sense of responsibility
resulting from the character of the work done and the insistence of the
profession upon unusual standards.1S These two requisites are deemed
essential if the interests of society, of the client, and of the attorney are to be
protected from the irresponsible laymen who are not bound by the canons of
ethics and are interested only in private gain.19 Therefore, in order to
insure adequate protection to society and to promote orderly administration of
justice,- the law should be practiced by those who are legally qualified and
bound by the canons of professional ethics.
In further support of the above arguments it is pointed out that the follow-
ing evils have arisen from the unauthorized practice of law: a decided increase
of professional misconduct; a reintroduction of unethical practices by the
licensed attorney so as to compete with the layman who indulges in such
practices; a grave injury to the public since justice is being administered by
untrained and incompetent people who have no obligations to the public and
whose sole object is private gain; a destruction of the confidential relation
11 Kales. A. M., "The Economic Basis for a Society of Advocates in the
City of Chicago," 9 Ill. L. Rev. 478 (1915).
12 1933 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 4-3611.
13 Note, 48 Yale L. J. 346.
14 S. Fla. R. R. v. Price (1893), 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638.
15 In re Cooperatives Law Co. (1910), 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 16.
16Notes, 48 Yale L. J. 346; 44- Harv. L. Rev. 1114.
17 Notes, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1114, 1118; In re Otterness (1933), 185 Minn.
25+, 232 N. W. 319. The Harvard note gives the impression that the corpora-
tions can be made to comply with the code of professional ethics. This argu-
ment is further substantiated by the fact that many such businesses have adopted
codes of ethics. See Hicks and Katz, "The Practice of Law by Laymen and
Lay Agencies," 41 Yale L. J. 69.
Is Cheatham, "Cases and Other Materials on the Legal Profession,"
pp. 55-56 (1938).
19 Noone; "Does Business Inefficiency of Attorneys Cause Business to Prac-
tice Law?" 22 Am. Bar Assn. Journal 609 (1936).
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between the attorney and client; and finally driving out of existence the legally
qualified attorney.2 0
These abuses suggest the very serious and difficult question of what can
and what should the legal profession do about it? Up to date, the courts
have indulged in the following direct and indirect sanctions to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law: the injunction; 2 1 the imposition of criminal lia-
bility; 2 2 the use of the writs of quo warranto, 2 3 mandamus and prohibition; 2
4
the use of declaratory judgments2 5 and the punishment for contempt of court. 2 6
The indirect sanctions in use are: the denial of recovery for services ren-
dered;2 7 the nullification of proceedings conducted by an unlicensed layman2 8
and the dismissal of suits and the setting aside of judgments rendered. 2 9
In the present case the court used the indirect sanction as its preventive and
the court in a well-reasoned opinion followed the clear weight of authority
in holding that an unlicensed person engaging in the practice of law could not
recover for services rendered.8 0
In addition to the above mentioned methods of meeting the problem it has
been suggested that the legal profession as a whole take a more determined
and aggressive stand to rid its ranks of all inefficient and unethical practices
by its delinquent members. 8 ' If such action were taken, it would help curb
the existing evils in the bar and greatly facilitate the solution of the problem.
F. L. M.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REMAND FOR REHEARING.-Plaintiff McCoy
brought an appeal from the award of the Industrial Board denying her com-
pensation for the death of her husband, alleged to have been caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant
corporation. A physician testified for the plaintiff that it was his opinion
that death resulted from heat exhaustion occasioned by the work done by
plaintiff's deceased. Two physicians were called for the defendant; one,
testifying in answer to a hypothetical question which included facts not proved
by the evidence, gave it as his opinion that the most logical explanation was a
20 Clark, "The Effect of Unauthorized Practice of Law Upon the Ethics
of the Legal Profession." 5 Law & Contemporary Problems 97.
21 Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Duorken (1934), 290 Ohio St. 23,
193 N. E. 650.
22 1933 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 4-3611.
23 Berk v. State ex rel. Thompson (1932), 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832; People
ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Assn. v. Cal. Protective Corp. (1926), 76 Cal. App. 354,
244 Pac. 1089.
24 Goodman v. Beall (1936), 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N. E. 470.
25 Richmond Assn. of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Assn. of City of Richmond
et al. (1937), 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153.
26 In re Morse (1924), 89 Vt. 85, 126 A. 552.
27 5 Am. Jur. 353; Creditors Nat. Clearing House v. Bannwort (1917), 227
Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886.
28 Bennie et al. v. Triangle Ranch Co. (1923), 73 Colo. 584, 216 P. 718.
29 Crawford Co. Treas. et al. v. McConnell et al. (1935), 173 Okla. 520,
49 P. (2d) 718.
30 5 Am. Jur. 353; Creditors Nat. Clearing House v. Bannwort (1917),
227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886.
81 Stinchfield, F. H., Our Position for the New Year, 23 Am. Bar. Asn.
Journal 110 (.1937); Hill, W. H., Address to the Indiana Bar Assn. on the
Integrated Bar, 14 Ind. Law Journal 81 (1938).
